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By Childs, I.R.W., Hastings, P.A [School of
Humanities and Human Services, QUT Carseldine,
Beams Rd, Carseldine 4034] Carlisle, R.D
[Chemical Hazards and Emergency Management
(CHEM) Unit, Department of Emergency Services
(Queensland)] and Powell, N.[F.I.Fire.E.]
Counter Disaster personnel stationed along the
Brisbane to Gladstone road-rail corridor took part in
focus groups aimed at eliciting their perceptions of
the hazards associated with the bulk transport of
dangerous goods that occurs along this route.
Six groups, each representing a Disaster District,
discussed their responses to a major road accident
scenario on a local stretch of the Bruce Highway
involving two fuel- carrying tankers and a resulting
explosion (BLEVE). That is, a low probability, but
high-impact and rapid-onset hazard. A wide range of
perceptions and responses to the scenario was noted
both within groups and between groups, reflecting
differing hazard and risk perceptions, resource
availability and mobility, and other geographical
factors. Initial management of the hazard,
establishing safe zones, effecting evacuation,
managing traffic and dealing with casualties were
all variously raised as challenges to the emergency
services personnel and the frameworks of
coordination and response under which they
operate. Some settlements along this transport
corridor were identified as being notably vulnerable
to a dangerous goods accident because of their
proximity to the highway, and the relative
inaccessibility of the resources needed to cope
with such an event.
Project Background
Brisbane and Gladstone, located some 600 km apart on
the east coast of Queensland, are the two major heavy
industrial centres of Queensland. Both have significant
chemical industries, and there is considerable bulk
transport of dangerous goods1 along the Brisbane-
Gladstone road-rail transport corridor. Over the past
decade, several road accidents occurred involving bulk-
transport vehicles carrying dangerous goods along this
route, resulting in deaths, injuries and major losses of
loads. Childs et. al. (2001) documented these incidents2
and broadly identified some of the factors along the
corridor that contribute to risk and vulnerability in
relation to dangerous goods transport.
The aim of the present research was to capture
perceptions held by key emergency services personnel
(primarily responsible for local counter-disaster
operations), government and community workers
located in several centres along the Brisbane-Gladstone
route regarding the risks of the bulk transport of
dangerous goods. The foci of the present study are to
elicit from these groups: levels of awareness of
dangerous goods travelling along the Brisbane-
Gladstone route, perceptions of the risks of
potential emergencies involving such materials, and
envisaged response and recovery strategies for an
accident scenario.
The research results presented here summarise the main
elements of a report submitted to the Queensland
Department of Emergency Services (DES) in December
2001 following a joint initiative between DES (CHEM
Unit) and the Queensland University of Technology
(School of Humanities and Human Services).
Perception by Counter Disaster
Personnel of the risks of bulk
transport of dangerous goods
along the Brisbane-Gladstone
transport corridor 
This Southeast Queensland research team reports on the wide range of perceptions and
responses of disaster personnel to a major dangerous goods road accident scenario.
1 The term ‘dangerous goods’ is used in relation to chemicals considered to be sufficiently hazardous to require regulation of their
transportation under the Australian Dangerous Goods Code (the ADG Code).
2 In 2001, there were three additional incidents at Mt. Larcom, Miriamvale and Caboolture resulting in two deaths.
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The Brisbane to Gladstone Transport Corridor 
A range of dangerous goods travels via bulk tankers and
intermediate or smaller containers along the Brisbane to
Gladstone transport corridor. These include petroleum,
liquefied petroleum gas, liquefied ammonia, molten
sulfur, liquefied chlorine, concentrated hydrochloric
acid, compressed hydrogen, and sodium cyanide.
The primary road route comprises Brisbane’s Gateway
Motorway, the Bruce Highway (National Route 1) and
feeder roads to/from regional centres and Gladstone.
The rail link (North Coast railway) closely parallels the
highway, with the two routes being rarely separated by
more than a few kilometers except in one section
between Maryborough and Gladstone (Map 1).
Both routes pass either through or near numerous
settled areas, including northern Brisbane localities,
the Sunshine Coast Hinterland, regional centres and
smaller towns. Although the Bruce highway now
bypasses several of the larger centres (e.g. Bundaberg,
Nambour and Caboolture) by several kilometers, the
highway remains the ‘main street’ for smaller towns
such as Childers.
Qualitative analysis of the combination of risk factors
(impact radius of potential dangerous goods emergencies,
population potentially exposed, local geography and
highway conditions and likely level of emergency
resources) suggested varying levels of potential risk and
vulnerability in the present dangerous goods context for
several geographical regions along the route (Childs et.
al. 2001). With the expected increase in the quantity of
chemicals passing along the corridor commensurate
with the projected population3 and industrial growth in
Southern and Central Queensland4, there is a need to
systematically assess risks and community vulnerability
along the corridor with a view to contributing to the
preparation of emergency services for dealing with any
hazard arising from such transport. While the
probability of a catastrophic accident is very low, the
consequences of such an accident, should it occur in a
built-up area, could be very severe. The potential risk
from the use and transport of dangerous goods
throughout the region must, however, be balanced
against the many economic, employment and other
benefits that accrue from these activities.
Methodology
The broader context of the research was a disaster/
emergency risk-management framework, based on the
Australia/New Zealand Standard on Risk Management
(AS/NZ 4360: Risk Management) and an approach to
vulnerability assessment outlined by the Australian
Emergency Management Institute (Hunter, 1996)5. This
includes a description of community risk perception.
While the availability of physical resources is an
important factor in coping with any disaster, the
effectiveness of such resources is a function of the quality
of emergency preparedness and planning at the local
level. Preparedness and planning, in turn, is a function
of numerous factors, but is anchored by risk perception
(e.g. Young 1998; Zamecka and Buchanan, 1999).
Community vulnerability to the hazards associated with
the bulk transport of dangerous goods, thus, depends in
the first instance on awareness and risk perception of
emergency response personnel along the route, and on
their perceptions of possible response and recovery
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Map 1: The Brisbane-Gladstone Transport Corridor. Refer to Childs et. al. (2001)
Table 1 for incident details.
3 Population Trends and Prospects for Queensland 2001, available from the Planning Information and Forecasting Unit, Department of Local
Government and Planning, Queensland.
4 Mooted developments include a new alumina refinery at Yarwun; a magnesium production facility at Rockhampton (Stanwell), about
one hour’s drive north of Gladstone; an ethylene dichloride plant at Gladstone.
5 Hunter’s (1996) model includes several stages of risk evaluation and assessment: (i) description of the hazard, the community, the
environment and the emergency services; (ii) analysis of interaction between the hazard, the community, the environment and the
emergency services; (iii) assessment of community risk perception; (iv) ranking of vulnerabilities; and (v) comparison of risk to existing
risk criteria.
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strategies in potential emergencies. The methodological
challenge for the research was therefore to elicit and
capture information relevant to these factors. 
Data collection
Focus group discussions with appropriate emergency
services personnel along the route were used to gather
perception and response information concerning the
risks of dangerous goods incidents. At each focus group,
general questions addressing risk perception, and a local
road accident scenario involving bulk dangerous-goods
transport, provided the catalysts for discussion (see
Map 1 and Table 1.). Given the scale of the proposed
scenario (see below), it was resolved to access Disaster
District Control Groups (DDCG)6 for the project because
of their membership of senior emergency service
personnel and other representatives (local government,
government services, health professionals etc.). It was
later noted that less senior, operational personnel and
crews often attended the project’s focus group meetings,
providing a practical perspective. Although access to
emergency services personnel was gained via the DDCG,
the committee itself was not the focus of the present
study, rather the attending Emergency Services
representatives were.
Focus group meetings were held in the six non-
metropolitan Disaster Districts along the Brisbane-
Gladstone route (viz. Redcliffe, Sunshine Coast,
Gympie, Maryborough, Bundaberg and Gladstone.
Perceptions of the risks posed by the scenario and
possible responses to these risks were sought from
focus-group participants. When necessary, the focus
group facilitator (project research officer) stimulated
discussion through a series of structured questions.
Areas of investigation and subsequent data-capture were
summarised under the headings of: awareness of
dangerous goods passing through local areas; commun-
ication; impact assessment; mobilisation of resources;
and location of resources. Discussions arising from the
scenario were further directed by the facilitator to
consider the progression of responses from pre-incident,
through to event response, post-incident and recovery
phases. Generally discussions took approximately two
hours and were scheduled as part of a DDCG meeting.
Police, Fire, State Emergency Service (SES) and local
government institutions were well-represented. The
Ambulance Service and medical authorities were
represented at most but not all meetings.
Several information-gathering and recording strategies
were employed by the researchers. One of the project’s
chief investigators was present as an observer on each
occasion to record discussion points. In addition,
participants (identified by service-affiliation and not as
individuals) were asked to write their key thoughts on
formatted information-recording sheets provided
(structured as described above). Usually within three
days of each focus group, the research team met to
identify the key issues that had emerged.
The scenario
In the case of a dangerous goods emergency or chemical
disaster, the onset speed of the hazard is usually rapid
and, consequently, warning time for evacuations is most
likely to be minimal or non-existent. Thus, in terms of
community vulnerability one is dealing basically with
pre-existing risk perceptions, the capacity for rapid and
Table 1: Disaster Districts where research focus groups were held,
with corresponding scenario locations. 
DISASTER DISTRICT SCENARIO LOCATION DESCRIPTION
Redcliffe Burpengary Highway passes through built-up area with entry ramp 
and highway speed limits*. 
Sunshine Coast Cooroy Highway passes near built-up area with entry ramp 
and highway speed limits*. 
Gympie Gympie Highway passes through extensive built-up area with intersections 
and urban speed limits*. 
Maryborough Howard Highway passes through built-up area (small town) with intersections 
and urban speed limits*. 
Bundaberg Gin Gin Highway passes through built-up area (small town) with intersections 
and urban speed limits*. 
Gladstone Gladstone Feeder road from highway passes through extensive built-up area with 
South (Kinkora) intersections and urban speed limits*. 
* Highway speed limits – 90–110 km/h; urban speed limits – 60–80 km/hr
6 As a result of the State Counter Disaster Organisation Act, 1975, Disaster Districts, Disaster District Control Groups (DDCG) and Local
Government Counter Disaster Committees (LGCDC) were established in Queensland. Membership and functions of the separate
groups/committees are outlined in Counter Disaster and Rescue Services (2001a; 2001b)
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effective response by emergency services and the
community’s capacity to respond post-event. The latter
is particularly related to the resources of the emergency
services to evacuate post-event, and to cope with
potential casualties and injuries resulting primarily from
the effects of fire, blast or toxic gas release.
The written scenario presented to focus groups in the
present research involved a collision between a petrol
tanker (20,000 litre) and an LPG tanker at a local
intersection. This resulted in a substantial fire and a
BLEVE7 approximately 15 minutes later. Locations
varied from an isolated stretch of the Bruce highway
near the small settlement of Howard to the busy
northern fringe of the Brisbane metropolitan area
(Caboolture). Potential blast and danger zones were
presented visually to the focus groups in the form of a
short video of a BLEVE incident8, maps and air photos.
Under the scenario, the immediate consequences
following the BLEVE were 20 casualties, 40 severe
injuries and traffic banked up on the Bruce highway.
The focus groups were also asked to consider questions
of community recovery in the medium and longer term.
Emergent issues from focus
group meetings 
This research proceeded on the understanding that
individuals would not be directly identifiable in the
reporting of results. Therefore, the following information
is presented in a manner, and at a resolution,
appropriate to that understanding. Only when
comments are general by nature, and do not directly
identify individuals, are they attributed to particular
focus groups or participating organisations. Some
comments reported do not relate directly to the scenario
used, but rather to response to dangerous goods
emergencies in general. The descriptions below
sometimes reflect perceptions of senior officers
anticipating what crews attending incidents would do,
and sometimes reflect the perceptions of those who were
likely to be actually attending an incident at a given
time. Attendance and participation in focus groups on
the day was the determinant of sources of perception.
Awareness and risks of chemical hazards
Participants were generally aware of a wide range of
hazardous materials transported along the road and rail
routes in bulk containers. Fuels (petroleum, diesel LPG),
farm chemicals (fertilisers and pesticides), chlorine,
ammonia, acids, explosives and cyanide were the most
frequently nominated. From the knowledge of the
researchers, these results indicate a reasonable picture of
the types of dangerous goods moving along the route.
Nevertheless, it was commonly reported as a cause for
concern that information regarding quantities and
timing of shipments was not easily available to local
emergency service personnel. Focus-group participants
were overwhelmingly of the opinion that the threat to
their communities from the transport of bulk
chemicals/dangerous goods was increasing. 
Responses to scenarios
In all focus groups there was a degree of initial skept-
icism by some individuals regarding the probability of
the scenario eventuating in reality. In most cases this
skepticism dissolved (a) after the BLEVE video (Cairns
1987) was shown, and (b) after initial discussion
established a recognition of the serious consequences of
such an event, albeit at a low probability of occurrence.
There was no consistency of emergency response to the
scenario across the focus groups and, hence, no
consistent indication that a rote response would
generally be elicited from the invocation of a standard
set of operational procedures and instructions. The
scope of the present research does not, however, extend
to evaluating the envisaged responses in terms of the
formal procedures, but simply notes this inconsistency
and seeks to contextualise it within overall emergency
response and community vulnerability.
Initial risk perception and response
Focus groups indicated that, in the initial stages of the
scenario (i.e. pre-BLEVE and during the explosive
phase) indicated that Queensland Fire and Rescue
Participants thought the threat to their communities from the transport of bulk
chemicals/dangerous goods was increasing.
7 BLEVE. Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion. Computer modelling carried out by the CHEM Unit, Queensland 
Department of Emergency Services, indicates that a BLEVE of a 14 tonne LPG tanker would have injurious thermal effects 
within a radius of 240 metres.
8 A video compiled by QFRS from a set of still photographs of the Cairns BLEVE in 1987.
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Service (QFRS) officers, rather than Police, would take
the leadership role on the ground if present. 
Two broad response patterns were evident in dealing
with the pre-BLEVE fire, should Queensland Fire and
Rescue Services (QFRS) crews arrive in time. One view
was that if QFRS could get to the scene quickly enough
(within minutes) and play water onto the LPG tanker to
cool its temperature, a BLEVE could be avoided. Some
QFRS officers considered that taking such action, would
lead to a high probability of injury or death to attending
personnel placed in the danger zone. Nevertheless, an
emergent view was that this approach may ‘buy time’
for evacuating the public. Furthermore, some QFRS
participants felt that pressure from public and
community expectations would mean that crews would
attempt to fight the fire – even if the professional
judgement suggested that to do nothing, except to
evacuate the area, was the best action. Other QFRS
officers made a much more conservative initial risk
assessment and insisted that 1500m clearance be
achieved from the accident site. One group commented
that after conducting an evacuation there would be little
more that they could do to modify the hazard. 
Evacuation and establishing ‘safe’ zones
A critical question explored by all focus groups was how
to effect an initial evacuation of crowded areas at risk in
the post-accident pre-BLEVE period; for example
shopping centres adjacent to the accident scene, and
motorists in vehicles ‘banked up’ along the highway.
When the need to evacuate the public from the accident
vicinity was not raised by focus groups, the question
was prompted by the facilitator. 
There was general acknowledgment of the potential for
an initial lack of coordination among the emergency
services in establishing safe zones and evacuating those
deemed at risk. This was arguably driven by the
unfamiliarity, speed and scale of the proposed incident.
Focus group participants were unaware of specific
evacuation plans under the circumstances of a rapid-
onset hazard such as the one presented. Given that the
available time for the required evacuation was very short
(i.e. 15 minutes under the scenario), participants
generally acknowledged that it would probably have to
be achieved by first-arriving QFRS or police officers. 
A concern of several police officers who had had
experience with evacuations was the difficulty of
managing the public under circumstances of danger.
Given the scenario, the comment was made that it was
easy enough to stop traffic, but it may be quite difficult
to persuade people to leave their vehicles unattended in
order to evacuate an area. Police participants reported
resentment from members of the public unwilling to
accept Queensland Police Service (QPS) authority when
being asked to interrupt their business or activities and
to leave an area. State Emergency Service volunteers
were noted to face similar issues. The solution was seen
to be the declaration of an ‘emergency situation’ under
the Public Safety Preservation Act, 1976 9 which gives
additional powers to police.
Establishing safe distances for the public (and the
emergency services) and maintaining these was seen as
another problematical issue. Hazard identification and
risk perception on the part of emergency services
personnel at the scene clearly becomes critical in this
context. One focus group commented that when an
evacuation zone had been established, the public would
‘take the lead’ from emergency service personnel as to
the distances that should be maintained from an
incident. The problem was that in a situation where
emergency service personnel have entered the danger
zone, the public may underestimate the safe distance
required, and, without good crowd control members
of the public may enter the danger zone. 
Discussion of the practicalities of achieving a successful
evacuation and controlling crowds under the scenario
conditions raised some communication issues. One
interesting line of inquiry questioned how emergency
services personnel at the scene would rapidly and
authoritatively issue evacuation orders directly to the
public. Do police officers possess public address systems
9 This can be invoked very quickly by a commissioned Police officer, even if not present at the scene.
Skepticism about the likelihood of the disaster scenario dissolved after participants were
shown evidence of previous events.
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or hand-held loud hailers in their vehicles? Several
police respondents conceded that such equipment may
not be readily available, given the rapid-onset hazard. 
Traffic control
One of the main topics of discussion in several groups
was how to manage gridlocked traffic caused by such an
accident on the highway. This problem was particularly
severe for the Burpengary scenario location (Redcliffe
Disaster District focus group) because of heavy traffic
just north of the metropolitan area. Relaying information
both among emergency service personnel and to the
public (i.e. stationary gridlocked motorists), clearing
congestion on the highway, diverting traffic to side-roads
and evacuating casualties were seen as critical problems.
The possibility was raised that some critically injured
victims may actually expire before they could be
evacuated because of delays caused by traffic congestion.
A suggestion was that this situation could be
ameliorated by the use of helicopters. In other less busy
locations, however, the traffic control issue was regarded
as much less of a problem as drivers may have more
room to manoeuvre and may have local knowledge to
take alternative routes. 
Resource availability and mobilisation
A key concern for most focus-group participants was the
availability and mobilisation of adequate resources to
initially deal with the accident (and hazard), and then
the chaotic aftermath of the scenario. At all meetings,
emergency service representatives voiced strong concern
over the accessibility of appropriate resources at the
incident locations. Issues involved the availability of:
emergency service personnel (particularly experienced
personnel), communications, medical aid, equipment,
water and foam. 
Across all groups and scenarios, it was generally
accepted that off-duty personnel would have to be
recalled, and resources of surrounding localities
requested. Given a fast-onset hazard, the time taken to
contact such personnel and for them to arrive at the
scene were significant issues. ‘Next available’ QFRS,
QAS10 and QPS resources could be up to 30 to
45 minutes travel time away and it was not always clear
that even local services could reach the scene
‘pre-BLEVE’. Furthermore, highway traffic congestion
was deemed likely to impede the arrival of emergency
services, and senior officers, whose ‘on site’ presence
would be desirable in the circumstances. State
Emergency Service (SES) personnel, generally viewed as
having potential roles in crowd control and traffic
monitoring, could take an hour or more to mobilise,
even if locally available.
The availability of adequate and experienced personnel
at the scene was viewed as potentially important to
aspects including hazard and risk identification, and
evacuation. In some regions and remote localities, it was
suggested that the initial tasks of hazard identification
(i.e. recognising the potential for a BLEVE) and the
immediate response may fall to an auxiliary fire officer
(e.g. Rural Fire Service). There was speculation that
these operatives would not be adequately resourced, and
may not recognise the risk of a BLEVE.
One focus group raised the problems of establishing a
command post and effecting evacuations where incidents
occurred in areas serviced by small or ‘single officer’
police stations. Settlements along the Brisbane-Gladstone
corridor were specifically identified as being
representative of these contexts. Therefore, from the
perspective of resource accessibility, such small commun-
ities may be the most vulnerable to this type of hazard. 
Further discussion of the experience levels of emergency
services personnel likely to attend the emergency scene
occurred at some meetings. This was particularly raised
by police representatives in one region where there are
high proportions of relatively inexperienced officers.
This was seen as a potential problem if junior officers
were left with the difficult task of effecting a rapid
evacuation of members of the public from the high risk
blast area (assuming such a zone had been defined).
This situation is exacerbated where senior officers would
not be able to easily access an incident location due to
highway gridlock. QAS crews were also identified as
likely to have inexperienced crew members in some
areas. QFRS cited their policy of maintaining a crew of
‘balanced experience’ on fire trucks with no more than
one junior (i.e. <3 years experience) officer on an
operational vehicle at any one time. 
In terms of communication infrastructure, some
problems were noted with the mobile phone network
encountering ‘dead spots’ along some stretches of the
highway. A similar problem was also noted for dead-
spots for 2-way radios in some areas. One group
commented that ‘truckies’ with radios may provide an
opportunity to gain first-hand information from the
incident scene in the early stages, and where access
problems existed for initial emergency service vehicles.
Given the specific nomination of casualty numbers
within the scenario, access to, and mobilisation of
emergency medical support was seen as critical.
Discussion of the treatment of patients with severe burns
turned to the allocation of hospital beds. From the
advice of medical personnel participating in the focus
groups, the capacity of most regional hospitals (relevant
to this study north of Brisbane) to deal with emergency
burns victims appears to be limited to 3–4 beds. It was
suggested that the further allocation of burns victims
would most likely be handled from Brisbane, and
10 Queensland Ambulance Service
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involve patients being transported to Brisbane hospitals
by air. One group speculated that this mode of patient
transportation could take several days if there were
multiple casualties. This group also raised the issue of
‘tough decisions’ having to be made in terms of
allocating relatively scarce medical resources/
opportunities to the injured at the time of the incident. 
There was a strong opinion expressed that heavy
machinery for site works should be available through
the local government channels. Provision of adequate
protective clothing (level 2 or 3 suits) for QFRS officers
and auxiliary fire officers dealing with toxic releases in
small towns was also raised.
Recovery phase
Following considerations of immediate response to the
scenario, the facilitator directed discussions to the
longer-term recovery phase. In recovery, there is an issue
of differentiating the broader and longer-term roles of
‘disaster management’ and the shorter–term roles of
‘incident management’ that may directly involve
operational emergency services and SES personnel.
Depending on the perception of ‘disaster’ vs. ‘incident’,
different roles and responsibilities within the disaster
management framework should be activated. This relates
to how well the various players in Emergency Services
understand the impact that the event has on the
community. The disaster management system only
responds if the impact on the community cannot be
adequately managed by local emergency services and
existing community arrangements11. Investigation of this
aspect is beyond the scope of the current research, but
may have implications for explaining some of the
observations reported below. 
Wider community dislocation
Social dislocation ensuing from the scenario presented
was not generally raised as a planning issue by focus-
group participants in this project. This may reflect a
need to prioritise the management of the immediate,
physical threat and/or result from perceptions of the
scenario and committee roles as indicated below. Only
in one group did an individual raise the issue of social
dislocation; the comment being that the affected
community would be ‘in shock’. Another group was
prompted to discuss longer term social recovery, but
offered few specific ideas on the needs or management
of such. General uncertainty surrounded the issue of
organisational responsibility dealing with the wider
community, particularly in the immediate and medium-
term post-incident phase. In the longer term this
responsibility would be that of relevant government
departments and community organisations
(e.g. Department of Families, Red Cross, etc.)
Further issues: roles of committees
The present research used Disaster District Control
Group (DDCG) meetings to access emergency services
personnel to investigate their perceptions of a
dangerous goods transport incident and associated
rapid-onset hazard response. The research focus was
not specifically on critiquing the roles and operations of
organisational structures, such as DDCGs or Local
Government Counter Disaster Committees (LGDCGs),
although the relevance to the current research of their
separate functions is clearly recognised. Nevertheless,
comments and observations made at focus group
meetings suggest that a broader set of issues can be
distilled in this context, and await further investigation.
The following represents an attempt by the researchers
to articulate these issues, based on information and
observations gained from the focus group meetings and
follow-up work.
One issue to emerge from the research relates to the
roles of, and links between the DDCG and the LGCDC.
The relative responsibilities of these committees is
established within State law and disaster plans (State
Counter Disaster Organisation Act and the State Counter
Disaster Plan). Nevertheless, faced with the practicalities
of responding to the scenario presented in the project
(a rapid-onset, high impact technological hazard)
relative roles and activities of the groups, as perceived
by personnel involved in response activities, were
sometimes blurred. Again, the researchers caution that
this observation emerged from focus group discussions,
and its investigation was not originally part of the
research design.
Opinion varied widely on the appropriate
responsibilities of the DDCG and the LGCDC in the case
of the specific scenario presented. The researchers noted
varying degrees of willingness to take ownership of the
scenario situation across the groups. In some, it was
suggested that DDCGs would be quickly activated, while
not in others. It was recognised that the event would
unfold too quickly for either the DDCG or LGCDC to
convene, let alone play an effective role initially. The
immediate response phase would most likely be dealt
with exclusively by operational personnel. Later
response and recovery is therefore the time for potential
responsibility for these committees. The DDCG was seen
as playing a role in the recovery phase of a disaster in
some focus groups, while in others members saw their
group as having no role at all in the longer-term
recovery phase. 
The distinction in determining the roles of the two
committees was contingent upon the perception of the
particular research scenario as being either a ‘disaster’ or
an ‘incident’; the former being a larger scale and
11 Wayne Ripper, Director, Disaster Operations, Counter Disaster and Rescue Services, Queensland Department of Emergency Services. 
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Recommendation 1: Awareness of chemical hazards
That opportunities be identified to improve the availability to local emergency services of information regarding the
transport of dangerous goods along the Brisbane-Gladstone corridor.
A major cause for concern was that information regarding quantities and timing of shipments of dangerous goods
through communities was not easily available, and that hazards from such sources were increasing. A record of
average annual movements of bulk dangerous goods loads along transport routes could be established. An
administrative system would be needed to collate and analyse the data relating to both road and rail transport.
Recommendation 2: Responses to scenario
That community vulnerability to dangerous goods transport along the Brisbane-Gladstone corridor be further
investigated by extending existing hazard mapping programs to include bulk transport of dangerous goods.
The hazard mapping program within the Department of Emergency Services could be developed further to integrate
vulnerability associated with the hazard. Furthermore, due to the relative rarity of major dangerous goods incidents
or disasters to provide experience, training based on mapped databases could become the primary mechanism for
improving emergency response. 
Recommendation 3: Resource availability and mobilisation
That the causes of the wide variability found in response between the focus groups to the research scenario be
investigated by considering factors such as local resources, location and training.
Availability and mobilisation of resources were identified as major issues. Limited resources may be an unavoidable
reality in small centres. An integrated strategy utilising the resources of a network of larger urban nodes along
transport routes could improve rapid deployment of specialised resources to smaller centres when needed. More
effective communication systems would reduce mobilisation times.
Recommendation 4: Evacuation 
That community safety programs along the corridor include an education component dealing with appropriate
responses by members of the public to emergencies arising from the transport of dangerous goods through
communities. 
The need to protect public safety by prompt evacuation in the case of dangerous goods emergencies was well
recognised. Public behaviour and acceptance of directives from emergency service personnel in such circumstances
could be improved if public awareness of such hazards and appropriate behaviour strategies was increased.
Recommendation 5: Recovery 
That the need to assist communities recover from dangerous goods disasters be clearly recognised in the disaster
management system.
While the need to pay close attention to longer-term community recovery from natural disasters is well-recognised
by the disaster management system, it is possible that this may be overlooked in the event of a major dangerous
goods incident.
Recommendation 6: Roles of committees
That the interpretation of rapid-onset, dangerous goods emergencies as either incidents or disasters be further
investigated. This would clarify the relative operational roles of Disaster District Control Groups and of Local
Government Counter Disaster Committees in responding to this type of hazard.
While the immediate incident response phase in the case of a dangerous goods emergency would be dealt with
exclusively by operational personnel, perception of the role of the two levels of disaster management committees
(Disaster District Control Group and of the Local Government Counter Disaster Committee) in the recovery phase
would hinge upon whether the emergency was regarded as a major incident or a disaster. Further examination of
these roles is needed to clarify this issue.
Key Recommendations 
Based on the project results, the researchers suggest the following recommendations:
therefore a more serious event, particularly in terms of
the degree to which the community is able to cope. If an
event is deemed to be a ‘disaster’ (i.e. beyond the
normal coping capacity of the community), a key role is
activated for the DDCG, whereas if it were a ‘major
incident’, this may not be the case, and responding
emergency services, the QPS and LGCDC maintain key
responsibilities. The question as to whether the scenario
of the present research was a disaster or an major
incident was therefore critical, yet the focus groups were
not consistent in categorising the scenario as either a
disaster or an incident.
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